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JOINT TENANCY IN CORPORATE STOCK
By E. T. Guilford of the Denver Bar

ITH the present-day widespread ownership of corporate stock there is a growing tendency on the part
of shareholders to have stock registered in the names
of joint tenants with right of survivorship.
This is not an article upon the nature, advantages or disadvantages of that method of ownership. It is limited to a
brief consideration of some of the common law characteristics or essentials of such a tenancy and of the possibility that
in some jurisdictions the intention of the parties may be defeated in the attempt to create the estate.
It not infrequently happens that a sole owner of stock
assigns the certificate to himself and another, reciting a joint
tenancy. The question then arisesCan A, sole owner of the stock, without the intervention of a third
party, by assignment to A and B as joint tenants with right of survivorship
and not as tenants in common create in A and B a good estate in joint tenancy.'

It is questionable whether in many of the states which
recognize joint tenancy the estate could be created in the manner indicated, in the absence of enabling statutes.
It is said that in order to have a joint tenancy there must
coexist four unities, namely, unity of title, unity of time, unity
of interest and unity of possession, that is, each of the owners
must have one and the same interest, conveyed by the same act
or instrument, to vest at one and the same time. 2 Blackstone
Comm. 179, 180; 33 C. J. 907. If any one of these elements
is lacking the estate will not be one in joint tenancy. 7 Rul.
Cas. Law, p. 811. Joint tenants cannot acquire under different titles. 2 Blackstone Comm. 181; Thompson on Real
Property, Sec. 1711. "Unity of title" has been defined to
mean that the interests must accrue by one and the same conveyance, and "unity of time" to mean that the interests must
commence at one and the same time. Staples v. Berry, 85
Atl. (Me.) 303. (Accurately, there are some exceptions to
the rule that joint tenants must acquire their estates at one
and the same time. Freeman, Cotenancy & Partition (2d
ed.) Sec. 11. Freeman continues: "But there seems to be
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no exception to the rule that the title of joint tenants must
arise from one act, deed or devise." See Thompson on Real
Property, Sec. 1711; Edwards' Property in Lands, 155). Personalty may be held in joint tenancy. Miller v. American
Bank & Trust Co., 71 Colo. 346; Erwin v. Felter, 119 N. E.
(Ill.) 926; Burns v. Nolette, 144 Atl. (N.H.) 848. It may
be stated as a general rule that shares of stock in an incorporated. company are personal property. Fletcher's Cyc.
Corporations, Sec. 3429; Anderson, Limitations of the Corporate Entity, Sec. 491a, and note.
While strictly speaking, a tenancy by the entirety is not a
joint tenancy (Stelz v. Shreck, 128 N. Y. 263), the unities of
title, time, interest and possession are common to both estates.
13 Rul. Cas. Law, p. 1098. It therefore seems that the cases
hereinafter mentioned dealing with the creation of estates of
entirety, insofar as the unities of title and of time are concerned, are applicable to joint tenancies.
The question was before the Court in Breitenbach v.
Schoen, 198 N. W. (Wis.) 622, where a mother owning certain certificates of stock assigned them to herself and her son
indicating an intention to create a joint tenancy. A controversy arose between the executrix of the mother's estate and
the son as to the ownership of the shares. It was held that a
joint tenancy was not created, the Court saying:
"Manifestly, the deceased could not convey an interest in the certificates
to herself, and it is quite clear that she did not intend to convey the entire
interest in the certificates to her son. Not being able to make a conveyance
to herself there was neither unity of title nor unity of time and under such
circumstances a tenancy in common was created rather than a joint tenancy.
There was therefore no right of survivorship as to the four certificates assigned."

The Court in Staples v. Berry, supra, in referring to the
four unities of joint tenancy, said:
"This would seem to contemplate conveyance or devise by A., the sole
owner, to B. and C. as joint tenants, not as splitting up of A's ownership so
that B. becomes a joint tenant with A."

In Wright v. Knapp, 150 N. W. (Mich.) 315, a husband
attempted to convey his homestead to himself and his wife by
a deed containing the following:
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"Between William Wright, of the township of North Plains in Ionia
County, and State of Michigan, of the first part, and William Wright and
Elizabeth Wright, jointly, the survivor to have full ownership of the same
place, of the second part",

The Court held that upon the death of the husband the
wife took the entire estate, basing its decision upon the ground
that a grantor cannot convey directly to himself, and applying the rule that where one of several grantees, for any reason, is incapable of taking, the other grantees capable of taking shall take the whole. The grantor named as grantee was
considered surplusage. The Court said that the intention of
the husband to create an estate in himself and wife by the entireties could not be questioned but that it was unnecessary to
determine whether such an estate could be created by the instrument under consideration. It is significant to note that
in the dissenting opinion of Bird, J., five judges concurring,
on the ground that the deed created a tenancy in common, it
was said that an attempt was undoubtedly made to create an
estate in entirety but it failed "because the formalities of the
law were not observed in its creation", and also that an estate
in joint tenancy was not created.
In Deslauriersv. Senesac, 163 N. E. (Ill.) 327, 62 ALR
511, Ida Deslauriers in 1903 acquired title to certain real estate. Subsequently she married Homer Deslauriers. In 1911
the husband and wife executed a warranty deed purporting
to convey the property to themselves as joint tenants and not
as tenants in common. The description was followed by the
statement: "Said grantors intend and declare that their title
shall and does hereby pass to grantees not in tenancy in common but in joint tenancy." The Court held that a person
cannot convey or deliver to himself that which he already
possesses; that he cannot by deed convey an estate to himself
or take an estate from himself, and that joint tenancy requires
that the tenants have one and the same interest accruing by
one and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the
same time, and that the interests of the wife and her husband
were neither acquired by one and the same conveyance nor
did they vest at one and the same time. The Court said:
"Two of the essential properties of a joint estate-the unity of title and
the unity of time-were therefore lacking. Where two or more persons ac-

DICTA
quire individual interests in a parcel of property by different conveyances and
at different times, there is neither unity of title nor unity of time, and in such
a situation a tenancy in common, and not a joint tenancy is created." (Citing
Breitenbach v. Schoen, supra; Green v. Cannady, 57 S. E. (S.C.) 832; 7 Rul.

Cas. Law, p. 811).

It was contended in this case that effect should be given
to the intention of the grantors to create a joint tenancy as expressed in the deed, and on this point the Court said:
"It was clearly the intention of the grantors to convey an estate in joint
tenancy. The intention of the parties to a deed will be given effect, if it can
be done consistently with the rules of law. * * * It was not for failure to ascertain the intention of the grantors that the grantees did not take title in a
joint tenancy, but because, under the law a joint tenancy could not be created
in the manner which was here attempted. * * * Ida Deslauriers failed to convey any interest to herself as a joint tenant, and for that reason she also failed
to convey to her husband in joint tenancy."

In Michigan State Bank v. Kern, 155 N. W. (Mich.)
502, Kern conveyed land to himself and wife. This was held
to be a tenancy in common and not one by the entirety.
The law now appears to be settled in New York that a
husband may by conveyance to himself and wife create a tenancy by entirety, reserving the same rights he would have under deed from another. Boehringer v. Schmid, 133 Misc.
236, 232 N. Y. Supp. 360, affirmed by the Court of Appeals
in 173 N. E. 220. The same view appears to be held in Oregon. In Dutton v. Buckley, 242 Pac. (Ore.) 626, 62 ALR
514, note, it was held that where a husband who was the sole
owner of land conveyed it to himself and wife, the wife joining in the conveyance, and it appeared that the intention of
the parties to the deed was to create such an estate in the land
that the survivor would take the whole estate in fee, effect
would be given to the intent of the parties. In Burns v. Nolette, supra, it is said: "A conveyance of personal property
should be given the effect intended by the parties."
In In Re Horler's Estate, 168 N. Y. Supp. 221, a wife by
deed granted and released to her husband an undivided half
interest in certain land and immediately after the description
recited:
"It being the intention of the party of the first part to transfer and con-

vey to the party of the second part an undivided one-half interest and estate
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in the aforesaid parcel of land and the improvements thereon, but so that the
party of the first part and the party of the second part shall hold and own the
same as joint tenants and not as tenants in common, and so that the survivor
shall have and take the absolute title and ownership in and to the same in fee
simple absolute."

The Court after stating that unity of title means that the
estate of joint tenancy must be created by the same act or instrument, said:
"The comptroller asserts that the wife derived her title from her grantor, and the husband derived his from his wife, and therefore there was no
unity of title. But it is the unity of title in the joint tenancy with which we
are concerned. Therefore, if the wife, as holder of the fee to the entire property, could by a deed to her husband, without the intervention of a third party,
create in her husband and heirs a joint estate, there would be unity of title
and of time, for the estate would be created at one and the same time by one
instrument. * * * It is commonly recognized that as to personalty a joint
tenancy may be created in husband and wife by assignment executed by the
one having the entire interest to husband and wife jointly, and that in such
case the four unities are present. In re Dalsimer Estate, 167 App. Div. 365,
153 N. Y. Supp. 58. So far, therefore, as concerns unity of title and time,
both exist where the joint estate is created by the deed of husband or wife,
owner of the fee, to the other directly."

In In re Klatzl's Estate, 110 N. E. (N.Y.) 180, Chief
Justice Bartlett said, concerning the effect of a deed by husband to wife which in his opinion and that of three other
judges created a tenancy by the entirety:
"I see no reason why the husband could not convey to his wife such an
estate as she would get by a similar deed to them from a third person, and at
the same time reserve for himself the same rights he would have under such
a deed. Even if the deed created a mere joint tenancy it would be good."

In the Boehringer case, supra, as reported in 232 N. Y.
Supp. 360, and affirmed, in answering the contention that the
deed of Schmid to himself and wife created a tenancy in
common because lacking the necessary elements of a joint
tenancy, the Court said:
"This contention rests upon the erroneous premise that the original title
or interest of the husband remained in him after the giving of his own deed,
while the wife's title, coming to her by that deed, created an estate in which
there did not exist a unity of title and time at least. On the contrary, the
ownership, title, and interest devolved upon both husband and wife as one
person at the same time by virtue of his deed. Each was seized of a whole
and not a separate part and there was, therefore, unity of title, interest, time,
and possession."
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A surviving joint tenant always takes by p'irchase, never
by descent, and holds the whole property under and by virtue
of the originalgrant or conveyance to the joint tenants. Babbitt v. Babbitt, 41 N. J. Eq. 392. The cases are in agreement
as to the necessity of the four unities and that joint tenants
must take at one and the same time and by the same act or
instrument, but appear to differ upon the question as to what
constitutes unity of title. Observe the different views held in
the Breitenbach case and In re Horler's Estate. The former
apparently proceeds on the theory that the conveyance by the
sole owner to herself and another with the expressed intention of creating the estate did not change the nature of the
ownership theretofore held, notwithstanding the intention to
initiate in the grantor a new kind of title. In the latter, the
wife's deed constituted the original grant or conveyance to
the joint tenants, transforming the wife's sole ownership into
a new kind of estate, so that she thereafter held in a different
capacity and in that sense the transaction might be distinguishable from the case of one conveying to oneself. The difference seems to result from the application of different rules of
construction and greater readiness on the part of some courts
to give effect to the expressed intention of the parties. Compare the Deslauriers and Dutton cases.
That joint tenancy with its right of survivorship is held
in high disfavor in many states, see Simons v. McLain, 32
Pac. (Kan.) 919. The possibilities of injustice inherent in
the estate have illustration in the case of Fleming v. Fleming,
174 N. W. (Ia.) 946.
It would seem that one contemplating the crleation of
such an estate, in a jurisdiction where recognized and unmodified by statute, would do well to reflect that its characteristic principles, feudalistic in origin, remain.
Bad laws are the worst sort of tyranny.-Edmund Burke.
Government is a contrivance of human wisdom.-Edmund Burke.
Then too in law there are a thousand causes of disgust, a thousand delays to be endured.-Juvenal.

